Introduction
The notion of sustainable development has come into vogue, both in academia and in business circles. After its introduction in 1987 by the World Commission on Environment and Development ('the Brundtland Commission'), the idea of meeting the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs has been widely embraced in the management literature as the reconciliation of environmental, social, and economic imperatives (Elkington 1998; Hart 1995; Hawken, Lovins, and Lovins 2000; Holliday, Schmidheiny, and Watts 2002) . Quite a few companies have adopted principles of sustainable business or, similarly, corporate (social) responsibility (Husted 2003; Smith 2003; Van Tulder and Van der Zwart 2006) . The World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD), representing many such proactive companies, numbers some 165 members with aggregate annual sales of 4,000 billion US dollars (Stigson and Rendlen 2005) .
While the principles of sustainable business have thus been widely embraced, it is less clear to what extent this has materialized in more sustainable practices, especially since it concerns the realization of a systemic equilibrium over a longer period (Ehrenfeld 2005; Roome 1998 ). However, the question of whether sustainable business will be sustained is particularly relevant, since the notion may be subject to implementation problems and erosion owing to changing 'management fads' or unfavourable economic tides. This chapter examines whether efforts to conduct sustainable business are accompanied by more sustainable practices over a longer period. In particular, the chapter seeks to identify the critical conditions that lead to the success or failure from the viewpoint of sustainable business development. In order to do so, I draw on an extensive case study of a large multinational food company that had committed itself to the realization of environmentally sustainable development; the social dimension of sustainability was not an issue. This firm, for reasons of anonymity called 'Greenheart', was intensively studied over a five-year period. The case is particularly interesting because of its dynamics: an initially successful move towards sustainable business was reversed after some time due to the concurrence of critical events. I extensively describe the case in order to provide all relevant information, which serves as input for the subsequent analysis of the company's behaviour through the conceptual lenses of stakeholder influence and organizational learning.
The chapter's main conclusion is that the successful pursuit of sustainable corporate development requires companies to institutionalize their environmental activities. The institutionalization of sustainable business has two dimensions: (i) companies must have a high and widely shared environmental ambition; and (ii) firms must deeply embed their environmental practices. On the basis of these dimensions, I
identify different types of corporate sustainability behaviour. While the study has focused on the environmental dimension of sustainable corporate development, it is likely that institutionalization is also required for social sustainability. The conclusion has important implications for academia. Since the perspectives of stakeholder power and organizational learning show important parallels and complementarities, they should be used in conjunction. Besides, the proliferation of longitudinal studies would significantly further our understanding of the dynamics of sustainable business development. The study's outcomes also have significant managerial implications, since high environmental (and social) performance requires not only top-management ambition but also company-wide support, routinization and systemization, and tight integration with other activities.
Case Description
The case study is an appropriate technique to understand processes and causes of complex social phenomena (Ragin 1987; Yin 1994) . A 'critical' case provides detailed insights and is representative of a focal phenomenon. The outcomes of such a study have implications going beyond the scope of the focal case (Gerring 2001; Yin 1994 ). The focal organization was selected because it had made an important commitment to the pursuit of corporate sustainability. Case information was collected at five points in time over the period 1999-2004, through in-depth, semi-structured interviews with the company's major internal and external actors, the perusal of firmspecific and other documents, as well as observations during site visits. Overall, some 60 information sources were used. All relevant data were transcribed and systematically coded with the help of Atlas/ti, an effective qualitative software package (Weitzman and Miles 1995) . The codes were based on contextual and theoretical issues, such as antecedents, environmental measures, stakeholder power, and organizational learning. After removing redundant information, the coded transcripts were converted into the case description; they also provided the basis for the subsequent analysis.
The case description starts with the company's history in order to highlight the chronology of critical events that shaped the corporate identity and practices. I then describe the environmental measures and performance by the focal company, in order to assess the actual actions and outcomes in terms of environmental sustainability.
The subsection on environmental management structure shows how the making and implementation of environmentally relevant decisions were officially designed. Next, I identify the most significant internal and external stakeholders, since their formal and informal influences critically shaped the company's sustainability voyage.
Case History
Greenheart was created around 1900. Starting as a small, craftsman-like Dutch food producer, it had evolved into a large corporation with over 20 subsidiaries on 4 continents, employing over three thousand people, by the end of the 20 th century. The last years of the previous century especially showed high increases of its sales and employees. Its branded food products were sold all around the globe. Greenheart had one particularly successful product, which was the second best-selling product of the sector worldwide. However, the company sensed that its sales were levelling off in an increasingly competitive market. This led to a radical decision. Early in 2001, the family that had, by and large, owned Greenheart for a century, sold its shares to a foreign, family-owned company, which was also operating in the food industry; the buyer had already possessed a minority interest of Greenheart's equity for several years. All shares, including those that were traded on the public stock market, fell into the hands of the new owner.
Prior to the take-over, Greenheart was run by one and the same chief executive officer (CEO) for 25 years. This CEO, who retired after the take-over, shared with his family predecessors a deep personal, religiously inspired conviction that nature is in a very critical situation. This conviction had far-reaching implications for the corporate values. Environmental concern was one of the four major values mentioned in the corporate mission statement and was a recurrent theme in the annual corporate report.
In 1990, the CEO embraced the conclusions of the 'Brundtland report' on the worrying condition of globally interrelated ecosystems. The company created a fund for environmentally benign investments which did not meet the corporation's normal financial standards. It also started to transfer 1% of its net annual profit to societal initiatives that aimed at the creation of environmental awareness at large. Within the highest strategic forums, the CEO fulfilled the role of environmental value-keeper.
The social dimension of sustainability was not articulated and no major initiatives were taken to promote social values within the company.
The new owner did not share this environmental sustainability drive. He had bought Greenheart because of its marketing and profit potential. After the take-over, which was formally a merger, the enlarged company ('Greenheart Plus') had more than doubled Greenheart's original sales volume, ranking among the global top-ten producers in its sector, with some 30 subsidiaries and over 8,000 employees throughout the world.
While the environmental value did not completely fade into the background, there was a significant shift in the corporate value attributed to the environment. This was reflected in a different mission statement. In 1995, Greenheart's mission was stated as follows: "We care for the environment, and are dedicated to reducing our impact to a sustainable level." Greenheart interpreted sustainability as conducting its business activities without negatively affecting the environment. 
Environmental Measures and Performance
During the 1990s, Greenheart took a host of internal environmental measures to reduce the company's environmental impact, starting with measures that were easy to realize ('low-hanging fruit'). These included: the purification and recycling of effluent water; the use of surface water for cooling purposes; the separation and recycling of solid waste; a green office plan (the use of recycled paper, the use of LPG for company-owned cars, the separation of solid waste, etc.); the use of thinner packing materials; and the local procurement of materials by an overseas subsidiary to avoid long-distance transport. Greenheart also installed solar panels and wind turbines at some production sites, which yielded the public image of a highly proactive company. When further internal measures were not feasible within the existing technical frames, external compensation measures were taken. Examples of this are a reforestation project and the purchase of energy from renewable resources ('green electricity') to compensate for excess emissions of carbon dioxide.
Early in 2000, the arrival of a new corporate environmental coordinator gave an impetus to new technical measures, such as closing water loops through the use of advanced membrane systems and reverse osmosis. Besides, additional measures were studied: stock-taking of short-term environmental improvement possibilities; product chain management, involving qualitatively and quantitatively different supplies (this was important because 60% of the environmental impact of Greenheart's main product was situated elsewhere in the product chain); the development of a sustainability management system in which managerial bonuses were related to environmental performance; and the replacement of the existing batch technology production method, leading to a 'normal' 10+% rate of defective products, by continuous process technology, including closed systems and better process control.
Continuous production would involve lower energy and water consumption, and lower emission levels of solid waste and effluent water.
Apart from these actual and envisaged technical measures, Greenheart engaged in initiatives to create environmental awareness. This was stimulated at all levels, ranging from the highest strategic levels to the shop floor. Awareness recurred on the agenda of the company's strategic forums, was part of corporate training programs, and was propagated through an internal, bimonthly environmental pamphlet.
Furthermore, special environmental days were organized to clean up the environment and there was social pressure among employees. A marketing manager noted: "When I leave my office while the light is on, someone else will turn it off, and say: 'Watch it.'" It should be noted, however, that environmental values were upheld by a minority, which had to activate a benevolent but passive majority of employees. A field visit in 1999 left one with the impression that operating personnel in particular seemed to lack environmental awareness. In the early 2000s, the commitment to environmentally inspired actions decreased due to financial difficulties and the departure of many top managers with environmental commitment.
After the take-over, environmental actions were reoriented towards those that were either required by law or to cost-effective measures, which paid themselves back within less than two years owing to savings on raw materials or other inputs. Three environmental priorities were identified: enhanced energy efficiency, decreased volumes of (effluent) water, and decreased production waste. This led to measures
such as the refinement of production techniques, tracing and repairing leakages of compressed air, and the increased recycling of effluent water. Environmental projects that were not directly rewarding, such as awareness creation, research on continuous production and on product chain management, the conceptualization of sustainability, the elaboration of a sustainability management system, external compensation measures, and the development of renewable energy, came to an end. The annual budget of over 2 million euros for environmental actions, that had been agreed upon before the take-over, was frozen when the financial tide was rough and eventually faded into obscurity.
In the 1990s, Greenheart measured its environmental impact through a quantitative, tailor-made environmental barometer, which focused on 5 global areas of environmental disruption: greenhouse gases, acidification, water consumption, effluent water, and solid waste. In each of these areas, the barometer measured the distance to the final target, which was a zero impact. Greenheart's environmental distance to target, as measured by the barometer, dropped from 25 in 1992 to 15 in 1996 and 12 in 1999. Afterwards, the exact score was unknown because environmental data were no longer systematically collected and analyzed. It was clear, however, that the distance-to-target had risen again because of the productionrelated problems and because of a higher automation rate. It was also felt that one overall figure was not very explanatory, because the indicator was built up of a large number of heterogeneous components. It was therefore decided to abandon the existing barometer and to use more specific indicators. After the dramatic year 2002, with its important production-related problems, the performance at the main Dutch production site showed, by and large, progress in the (newly) designated priority areas of energy efficiency, production waste rate, and fresh-water consumption and effluent-water production. At the same time, this subsidiary did not fully meet all regulative requirements, especially administrative obligations.
Environmental Management Structure
Prior to the take-over, the environmental objectives were initiated and ratified at -
After the take-over, the environmental management's centre of gravity progressively shifted from the corporate to the subsidiary level. The corporate TMT, while still having a member representing the environmental value, focused on socio-economic targets and abstained, by and large, from launching new environmental initiatives. The new owner's 'lean and mean' organization philosophy was applied to the corporate environmental department in 2003 when it was completely dismantled;
in its wake, company-wide activities such as the exchange of corporate environmental data and the alignment of local environmental policies halted. All environmental responsibilities were allocated to subsidiaries, who focused on locally relevant issues, particularly regulative compliance and cost savings with (positive) environmental side effects. While a formal management system was not universally embraced, environmental issues were addressed in a more systematic way, at least in the Dutch subsidiaries. Operational Teams (OTs) were created, consisting of the production manager, the heads of different functional areas (manufacturing, packing, engineering, logistics, etc.), the environmental coordinator, and other staff officers (personnel, finance, quality control) of the respective subsidiaries. The OTs were endowed with ample formal and financial authority as well as knowledge of different functional areas, but faced capacity constraints since all persons were involved on a part-time basis. The teams convened once a month to evaluate past environmental performance, trace (overt and hidden) problems, discuss new targets, and formulate new action plans. These plans were subsequently implemented by the department(s) concerned and coordinated by the environmental coordinator, who had regular bilateral contacts with the persons involved. The aim was to set up a standardized plan-do-check-act system with parallels to quality management and leading to incremental but continuous performance improvements. The new environmental management structure is displayed in Figure 2 .
Internal and External Stakeholders
The following actors, highlighted in italics, were the most salient stakeholders of National government was considered a very important actor. In the second half of the 1990s, a Dutch governmental representative coordinated a project on the application of the sustainability concept at the company level with three business organizations, including Greenheart, in divergent sectors. Greenheart's corporate environmental coordinator at the time highly appreciated this "very good dialogue," Delivery schedules were determined by customer demands and timely deliveries often entailed partial truck-loads. After the take-over, when cost savings became a dominant issue, efforts to enhance the energy performance of Greenheart Plus' distribution -through an enhanced loading degree, less frequent deliveries, etc. -were intensified, which engendered some environmental gains.
Analysis Greenheart (Plus) from a Power Perspective
During the 1990s, Greenheart's sustainability drive was initiated and sustained by the CEO's personal conviction that his company had to contribute to an environmentally sustainable world. The CEO incorporated the sustainability value into the company's mission. He also came up with, and provided ample support for, strategic objectives in the field of sustainability, which were implemented top-down through an elaborate environmental structure. Greenheart's corporate environmental coordinator functioned as an information interface between the corporate and the subsidiary levels, translating strategic objectives into operational targets and feeding subsidiary performance back to the apex. Greenheart's corporate technical staff provided knowhow to implement and standardize environmental initiatives. In the late 1990s, the sustainability value was widely shared among higher managers and white-collar workers, but there was a lack of commitment at the shop floor level. Despite persistent awareness creation efforts, the blue-collar workers predominantly pursued primary production targets. Subsidiary environmental coordinators faced the difficulty of getting concrete environmental initiatives implemented since they faced competitive time claims and because environmental activities did not constitute an integral part of the shop-floor routines. National government served as an important external ally to conceptualize corporate sustainability. Other external stakeholdersin particular, environmental pressure groups and transport companies -did not have a significant impact on Greenheart's environmental behaviour.
Power or influence has its origin in an actor (the influencer) holding resources such as authority, money, social norms, and information to which another actor (the influencee) is sensitive, leading to behaviour that the influencee would otherwise not display (Dahl 1957; DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Etzioni 1964; French and Raven 1968; Mintzberg 1983) . The importance attached to Greenheart's major stakeholders stemmed from the resources that they held, or to which they had access, and to which others were sensitive: formal authority (the CEO), economic resources (the CEO), environmental norms (the CEO), information (the corporate environmental coordinator, the corporate technical staff, national government), and the ability to implement initiatives (the subsidiary environmental coordinators as representatives of blue-collar workers). The CEO took the lead, and wielded his formal, economic, and social power to push the environmental agenda. Most internal actors acquiesced in his authority. Only blue-collar workers showed a certain degree of passive resistance because of competitive time claims, personal indifference, and a lack of embedding in their daily activities. The company's commitment to sustainability was initiated and spurred on top-down, and many environmental initiatives were supported. Ample formal, informational, and financial resources were allocated to the conceptualization and implementation of the sustainability objective. There was a tension at the shop floor level because operational influence was partially withheld from pursuing environmental targets, but still a significant number of concrete actions were taken.
Thus, the dissimilar resources of different stakeholders were, by and large, used in a cooperative way, yielding synergetic effects. The ensuing rise of Greenheart's sustainability performance was evidenced by a halving of its negative environmental impact, from 25 in 1992 to 12 in 1999.
Two factors marked a discontinuity in the company's environmental course of action. Following an external crisis in 2000, the composition of Greenheart's bestselling product was changed. This engendered important production problems and poor financial performance in major subsidiaries during the first years of the new millennium. The corporate TMT then attributed the highest priority to a short-term improvement of output and profit figures, ultimately involving a major reorganization.
From 2001 onwards, many employees ranked the sustainability cause lower than before because they felt that their jobs were threatened. As a result, the drive of most internal actors to pursue environmental targets decreased significantly.
A second factor of significance was the change of CEO. The former CEO, who had led Greenheart for over 25 years, was succeeded by a person who attributed much less importance to the environmental value. The new CEO decided that environmental initiatives should be confined to those that were required by law or that paid At the same time, the company's overall environmental ambition level had considerably decreased, since sustainability was no longer of primary importance.
This suggests that the sustainability value was less deeply rooted than might be expected. Certain actors tried to uphold the ambitious objective and were subsequently marginalized. Most internal stakeholders, though, showed little resistance towards the erosion of this value, suggesting that the pursuit of environmental sustainability was neither firmly embedded in the tissue of influential internal actors nor in the company's routines. While a direct comparison between the period before the major changes and the epoch afterwards is delicate owing to a change of environmental yardsticks, it seems obvious that the altered balance of power led to a regression of the company's environmental behaviour.
Greenheart (Plus) from a Learning Perspective
Throughout the 1990s, Greenheart's environmental performance, such as evidenced by the environmental barometer, improved dramatically. This progress was not necessarily the consequence of increased insights into environmental issues. Measures such as financing reforestation projects and procuring renewable electricity favoured the company's environmental performance but not per se its understanding of their technical nature. However, a substantial part of Greenheart's enhanced environmental performance was induced by the accumulation of new insights pertaining to the conceptualization and implementation of industrial sustainability. The company continued acquiring new environmental insights after the turn of the millennium, be it at a reduced pace, but the nature of newly acquired knowledge changed from predominantly strategic and conceptual to exclusively operational and applied.
Organizations learn when they increase their behavioural capacities owing to information processing, which involves the acquisition, sharing, and retention of new knowledge (Argote 1999; Huber 1991; Kim 1993) . Greenheart ( New insights that are related to cues like discovery, effectiveness, and innovation give rise to explorative learning, whereas insights that are strongly linked to existing practices -involving terms like adaptation, efficiency, and implementation -lead to exploitative learning (March 1991; Weick and Westley 1996) . Greenheart's search for conceptual clarity, its engagement with a variety of heterogeneous, strategically significant actors, and the consideration of new types of production methods in the late 1990s are all indicators of explorative learning. Operational measures were largely taken on an ad hoc basis. Well-functioning environmental routines, firmly embedded in an integrative structure, were largely absent. After the two major events, the company ceased its quest for business as unusual. While its explorative learning came to a halt, Greenheart Plus focused on exploitative learning. Existing practices were refined through minor adaptations of its production methods. This occurred on a systematic basis and was relatively well embedded at the operational level.
Organizational learning is most effective when different roles concur: idea generators who creatively combine technologies, markets, and products; internal entrepreneurs who apply new knowledge to concrete settings; boundary spanners who link local colleagues to external information sources; and sponsors who provide senior-management support for new ideas (Tushman and Nadler 1996; Nonaka 1996; Senge 1999 ). In the 1990s, different actors fulfilled key roles in Greenheart's learning process. Reflection platforms (with national government, with other companies in the food sector) as well as the last corporate environmental coordinator functioned as idea generators on the conceptualization of industrial sustainability. Greenheart's corporate environmental coordinators diffused salient environmental information, both from outward-in and from the strategic forums to the subsidiaries, thus acting as boundary spanners. Greenheart's CEO provided ample top management support for sustainability initiatives, thus fulfilling the role of sponsor. Only the role of internal entrepreneur was not well articulated within the company. The concurrence of three major learning roles led to a fairly effective organizational learning process.
The events of the early 2000s had major implications for learning roles. The change of CEO led to the disappearance of a major sponsor since formal top management support became weak and financial resources dried up. This was, to a certain extent, compensated by an increased formal commitment of subsidiary TMTs to local environmental initiatives. Idea generators were no longer considered since contacts with external reflection platforms were broken and the corporate environmental coordinator was dismissed. By contrast, the role of internal entrepreneur became more articulated through the OTs, who had to come up with concrete solutions. The role of boundary spanner shifted from the corporate environmental coordinator to the subsidiary coordinators, whereby it should be noted that the latter faced significant time constraints. Greenheart Plus thus showed the concurrence of three critical learning roles, though these roles were not highly articulated. Consequently, the company learned efficiently but at a lower pace than before.
Learning requires the allocation of sufficient resources for the acquisition and processing of new insights (Cyert and March 1992; Nonaka 1994; Senge 1999 ). In the late 1990s, relatively ample resources were available at Greenheart, with the exception of the shop-floor level. The availability of these resources, secured by top management support, enabled the company to progress on a highly ambitious learning path. After the two discontinuities, in the early 2000s, Greenheart Plus lowered its environmental ambition level. The budget for environmental initiatives was frozen, the corporate environmental department was eliminated, the corporate technical staff and external reflection platforms were marginalized, and no additional environmental staff was hired at the subsidiary level. The scarcity of resources for environmental initiatives slowed down the company's learning process.
Greenheart's quest for environmental sustainability is summarized in Table 1 .
Analytical insights from the two perspectives (stakeholder influence and organizational learning) are summarized using two major dimensions that emerged from the data: (i) the relative importance that organizational members attribute to environmental sustainability ('ambition'); and (ii) the degree to which environmental practices are an integrative part of the company's business as usual ('embeddedness').
The table shows largely divergent outcomes for Greenheart's subsequent stages of rise and regression.
- Table 1 about here
Discussion and Conclusion

Summary and Discussion
The case study shows the evolution of a company in its quest for environmental sustainability. Greenheart initially made great strides: the organization embraced sustainability as a core value, sought to reconceptualize its business activities, was open to a variety of (external) stakeholders, and allocated ample means to reduce its environmental impact. This venture lost momentum after a change of ownership and economic difficulties: the sustainability value was interpreted in a more restricted sense and became of secondary importance, environmental activities had to fit within the existing business frame, a more restricted number of predominantly internal stakeholders were considered, and the environmental budget largely evaporated; at the same time, environmental activities were undertaken on a more structural basis.
These findings suggest that the focal company went through subsequent phases of rise and regression during its sustainability voyage. The literature has described different levels of progress on the corporate sustainability path, ranging from early stages involving eco-efficiency and pollution control measures to more advanced stages of business process reconceptualization and product redesign (Sharma and Henriques 2005) . Alternatively, different corporate attitudes to environmental issues have been identified: from defensive and reactive, as evidenced by resistance to environmental initiatives, via compliance with regulatory requirements to offensive and proactive, with a prominent role for discretionary (that is, not legally required)
environmental initiatives and ample top management commitment (Henriques and Sadorsky 1999; Kolk and Mauser 2002; Zadek 2004) . Similarly, companies can be classified on the basis of their environmental management styles: from laggards, trying to evade environmental measures, via compliers to true believers, who take farreaching measures on moral grounds (Thornton, Kagan, and Gunningham 2003) .
Indeed, it has been argued that the 'normative case' for environmental initiatives, consisting of morally driven actions, tends to be associated with higher levels of proactiveness than the 'business case,' where fear of regulatory retaliation and economic self-interest are more dominant considerations (Garriga and Melé 2004; Smith 2003) .
While the focal company can easily be accommodated within the different classification schemes, the extant literature tends to assume, sometimes explicitly but mostly implicitly, that companies either adopt and maintain a particular environmental attitude or show increasing levels of proactiveness over time (Porter and Van der Linde 1995; Hart, 1995; Hawken, Lovins, and Lovins 2000; Holliday, Schmidheiny, and Watts 2002; Shrivastava, 1995) . This assumption seems to be based on the following line of reasoning. Companies generally ignore environmental issues until they are forced to comply with regulatory requirements. Once they are forced to take environmental actions, they 'discover' their economic benefits, in terms of improved reputation, enhanced sales potential, cost savings, and/or avoided liability claims. A final step is taken when business leaders make their organizations behave like good corporate citizens and take far-reaching measures on moral grounds, regardless of their immediate pay-offs. This pattern of rising proactiveness may have occurred in quite a few instances, but is by no means an iron law. The Greenheart case
shows that a company's rise in environmental performance may be followed by a period of regression.
The analysis in the previous section identified two reasons for this regression.
The first pertains to the company's ambition level. When Greenheart Plus entered economically turbulent waters, the environmental objective became less prominent.
The economic difficulties encountered and the change of ownership were important reasons for this lower priority. Saliently, the environmental regression met with hardly any internal resistance. Virtually all employees acquiesced in the reshuffling of corporate values. They accepted the new top-management priorities and preferred job security to the pursuit of environmental objectives. The vulnerability of the environmental value feeds the critique that corporate environmental or social initiatives should be regarded with suspicion since the primary raison d'être is an economic one (Hertz 2001; Klein 2001 ). An alternative argument is that since the sustainability drive had been largely imposed top-down, the environmental value had been neither widely nor deeply embraced throughout the organization. Change initiatives based on hierarchical power are unstable: they tend to fade over time since they lack wide (internal) support (Lawrence, Winn, and Jennings 2001) . Widespread endorsement is thus key to sustained progress, especially when it concerns new initiatives. From a learning perspective, the withdrawal of resources required to involve organizational members fulfilling critical roles leads to reduced progress on learning paths entered (Senge 1999) . It can thus be concluded that the pursuit of corporate sustainability requires high ambition, not only at the top-management level but also throughout the organization. High ambition shows similarities with the related notion of shared vision (Senge 1990; Shrivastava, 1995) , since both highlight the importance of organization-wide support. High ambition, however, goes beyond shared vision, since the former also connotes commitment to (environmental) challenges that are hard to realize (Simon 1976; Vergragt and Van der Wel, 1998) .
The second reason for regression was the lack of well-embedded environmental practices. Greenheart used to take a variety of environmental initiatives, but they were largely adopted on an ad hoc basis. Had these actions been more firmly embedded in ongoing routines, they would probably have been more resistant to changed top management priorities. Routinized practices, which have been adopted throughout the company and which have persisted for some time, are particularly inert. They are likely to meet with fierce resistance when attempts to change them are undertaken (Cyert and March 1992; Nelson and Winter 1982; Tushman and Romanelli 1985) .
Besides, Greenheart's environmental activities were largely taken in isolation, without benefitting from the synergies and 'protection' of intertwined activities. The integration of environmental and economic activities leads to the exploitation of common grounds and avoids, at least to a certain extent, the need to prioritize one type of activity over another when resource limitations would call for such choices (Porter and Van der Linde 1995) . Furthermore, systematically implemented activities that lead to measurable results, including environmental management systems such as ISO 14001, are more resistant to unfavourable economic tides and changing top management priorities than conceptual and ad-hoc measures (Bansal and Bogner 2002) . Therefore, environmental practices must be deeply embedded in corporate practices in order to sustain the pursuit of sustainable business. Embeddedness is related to structure (Argote 1999; Mintzberg 1979) , since both pertain to the way in which (environmental) activities are organized. Embeddedness is more related to permanence, though, since structure concerns the officially designed and readily changeable modus operandi, whereas embeddedness expresses the actual degree of ingrained commitment to existing cognitive frames and practices (Uzzi 1996 (Uzzi , 1997 .
Conclusion and Implications
The above results should be interpreted with some caution, since they are based on a single case study. An important conclusion from the analysis is thus that companies can only display environmentally sustainable behaviour over a longer period if they have: (i) a high and widely shared environmental ambition; and (ii)
well-embedded environmental practices. The behaviour of such organizations can be labelled as 'institutionalized sustainability. ' (cf. Ackerman 1973) . Institutions refer to collectively taken-for-granted behaviour, materialized through widely accepted practices, rules, and technologies (Greenwood, Suddaby, and Hinings 2002; Lawrence, Winn, and Jennings 2001; Tolbert and Zucker 1996) . The two dimensions identified are critical to understanding the behaviour of organizations over a longer period. Sustaining corporate sustainability efforts requires both deeply held and widely embraced values (the 'ambition' dimension) and the adoption of ingrained, routinized practices (the 'embeddedness' dimension). Companies scoring high on the ambition dimension but low on the embeddedness dimension, such as tended to be the case with Greenheart prior to the critical events, are engaged in an 'idealist sustainability quest.' Their actions are conceptual, ad hoc, and symbolic. By contrast, companies with a low ambition level but a high degree of embeddedness, as tended to be evidenced by Greenheart Plus, are characterized by 'realist environmental management.' They are concerned with the systematic implementation of technically feasible measures, the scope of which is not to attain environmentally sustainable levels. The different types of behaviour related to corporate environmental sustainability are displayed in Table 2 .
The present study has mainly focused on the environmental dimension of sustainable corporate development, though the outcomes may also be relevant for social sustainability. Many social and environmental issues in business share features such as a systemic nature, a dual (normative and business) character, and a 'natural subordination' to economic imperatives. Therefore, institutionalization would seem to be critical for both the environmental and social dimensions of sustainable corporate development.
- Table 2 about here (Contu and Willmott 2003; Weick and Westley 1996) . However, the outcomes from both analyses, which were summarized in Table   1 , showed striking parallels when related to the dimensions of ambition and embeddedness. Both perspectives are also complementary (Gladwin 1993) . On the one hand, stakeholder influence shapes organizational learning; the latter becomes effective when influential actors allocate the resources needed to learn (Senge 1999; Roome and Wijen 2006; Tushman and Nadler 1996) . Besides, actors have to be sufficiently powerful to fulfil critical learning roles effectively (Contu and Willmott 2003; Coopey 1996; Roome and Wijen 2006) . On the other hand, organizational learning affects a company's power relations: the more insights are acquired concerning the desirability or necessity to consider certain actors, the more an organization will perceive these actors as important and become sensitive to their resources (Nooteboom 2000; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978) . Using the complementary perspectives of stakeholder power and organizational learning in conjunction with each other, therefore, significantly enhances our insights.
Besides, it is important to study organizations over a longer period in order to observe unfolding dynamics, especially in the field of sustainable development.
Longitudinal studies show not only the mechanisms leading to changes but also reveal the degree to which intended changes are sustained over a longer period. Many academic studies have focused on inertia and resistance to change (Baum 2002; Gersick 1991; Tushman and Romanelli 1985; Valley and Thompson 1998) .
Sustaining environmentally (and socially) relevant behavioural changes against all odds over a longer period has received far less attention, though this issue is particularly relevant when organizations have not yet institutionalized environmentally (and socially) relevant practices (Senge 1999) . Indeed, institutionalization is a prerequisite for sustainable corporate development, key to understanding the conditions under which sustainable development can turn from well-intended management by exception into widely practised business as usual.
Longitudinal studies focusing on how attempts to conduct more sustainable business are initiated, leveraged, and maintained would further our understanding of such institutionalization processes.
The present chapter has unpacked the mechanisms underlying the dynamic behaviour of a company pursuing environmental sustainability. Many writings pertaining to drivers of sustainable development or corporate social responsibility point to isolated factors such as enlightened leadership, a competitive edge, and societal pressure. By contrast, this chapter suggests that the development of corporate sustainability requires the concurrence of ambition and embeddedness. The higher the scores on these dimensions and the more systemic the corporate orientation, the more a company has institutionalized its sustainability endeavour and the higher the 
